Arab Media & Society

Let me close with a final point.  Advocates of the Charter argue that its principles, approach, and philosophy of the state mirrors developments in satellite regulation that have already occurred elsewhere in the world, even in the freedom-professing West. 

We can start from a truism. Over the last two or three decades, as the world has moved from almost exclusive reliance on a highly regulated licensed terrestrial broadcasting system to one where, as a result of the shift to satellites, cable and the Internet,  the opportunities (or possibly appetites) for regulation have decreased. For a while, it seemed that this shift implied (or required) a reduced level of state control and management.  But dangers and perceptions of dangers (moral, physical and political) endure, and the penchant to establish limits, impose punishments and standards and choke off communication is as alive as ever.  Regulation is resurgent.

A bit of history is helpful, when it comes to thinking how states have felt about the power of satellites and their relationship to national sovereignty.  In the beginning, with the founding of Intelsat, control occurred through exclusive governmental or intergovernmental ownership of all satellites, making it simple for states to decide who had access to the satellite’s transponders.  Even today, with all the privatization, remnants of this policy remain in Eutelsat, and more markedly in Nilesat or Arabsat.  As satellites became privatized, another issue became salient: namely whether any government (and on what basis) should regulate or control what signals could be carried and where those signals could be delivered.[4]

 The international debate about these questions has gone through several phases.  There was the extensive debate (that ended in tatters) in the late 1970s at the UN to design a system of international standards. At that early point, some states proposed a consent regime, in which states agreed that no signal would be directed at the territory of a state that did not agree to receive it.  Together or in addition, there was also a proposed standards regime whereby Treaty states would assure that no signals would be carried that violated agreed international norms.  Neither approach was adopted as binding law.  

With the rapid growth of satellite capacity and increasing privatization and competition in the 1970s, regulation, by and large, took a back seat.  But in the post 9/11 world, there are renewed attempts at regulation and control. The considerations that informed the first stage—the UN debate—are present again, but the geopolitical considerations mean that many of the key players occupy different positions.  During the NATO bombing campaign of 1999, the United States and its allies persuaded Eutelsat to shift a Serbian channel off its transponders. France has restricted Al Manar’s access to Eutelsat and the United States has followed suit, invoking anti-terrorism laws.  And in the recent debate to modernize the Television without Frontiers Directive (making it an “Audiovisual Without Frontiers” counterpart), many European states sought (more or less unsuccessfully) to gain more sovereignty than the country of origin principle allowed.

 In Europe and the United States, there is both more leeway for programming and more calls for regulation, especially in the interests of children and in reaction to perceived national security threats.  But—at least at the moment—none of these efforts have the deadening capacity to restrict or punish satellite services that could occur under the Charter.  There are abuses, to be sure, and there are exceptions.  But nowhere in Europe or the United States is there so pervasive a declaration of principles of restriction; nor is there such a continued threat of multiple powers, multiple authorities that can have the right to set rules;  nor is there anywhere near the threat to limit criticism and insult the authorities.  Vague words and potentials for the exercise of authority are the feasting place of authoritarian governments.

There might be reasons to have an Arab Broadcasting Charter.  There may be issues of power to be clarified.  And the pressures of commercialization, modernization and threats to security may well necessitate novel approaches to regulation.  Perhaps a charter, subject to additional debate and refinement, can serve generally desirable purposes.  But more work will have to be done to achieve a workable regional system of harmonization consistent with an effective flow of information and entertainment in a way that meets agreed international standards. 

Monroe E. Price is Director of the Project for Global Communication Studies and teaches at the Annenberg School of Communication at the University of Pennsylvania.  He also directs the Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy Research in London and is Chair of the Center for Media and Communication Studies of the Central European University in Budapest.