Resistance beyond time and space: Hizbullah's media campaigns
Issue 5, Spring 2008
The February 2008 assassination of paramilitary mastermind Imad Mughniyeh and the July War of 2006 presented challenges to Hizbullah’s capacity as a military organization.[1] Yet the group has attempted to use its media capabilities to translate the two events into political capital in Lebanon and the wider Arab World. While the reach of Hizbullah’s media apparatus has grown with its integration into Internet-based platforms, the group has also become adept in the creation and presentation of its political media content. Hizbullah’s media responses to these specific incidents demonstrate how the group has become skilled at framing key episodes of political violence against the backdrop of historical themes that resonate with the group’s domestic and regional constituencies.
With a narrative that transcends and conflates time and space, the group’s media aim to cultivate Hizbullah’s image as being the vanguard of resistance against perceived Israeli and Western domination. In commemorative videos produced by Al Manar in response to Mughniyeh’s death, this narrative is largely derived from the group’s own unique political culture of militancy and Shiism, while aspects of the group’s prolific media response to the July War of 2006 also incorporate broader nostalgic themes of pan-Arabism. Thus, the group has sought to utilize these events to further reinforce its image of defiance by tapping into themes of revisionism that have timeless currency with its local Shia and greater Arab audiences.
The development of Hizbullah’s media apparatus
Hizbullah’s use of websites as a platform for streaming audio, videos, articles and RSS feeds means that the group is no exception to the wider wave of media format convergence that has accompanied the rise of the internet.[2] This technological enhancement in media has corresponded with Hizbullah’s gradual expansion of its political reach from a Lebanese resistance organization to an Arab nationalist movement with a regional agenda.[3]
Between its inception in the mid 1980’s and the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, Hizbullah’s media apparatus grew from an unlicensed radio station and newspapers, into several websites and the satellite station Al Manar which had existed as a terrestrial broadcaster since 1991.[4] Since the 2006 conflict, the group’s Internet presence has expanded to over fifteen affiliated websites.[5] Before its embrace of new media Hizbullah initially relied on journals to propagate its message. Its first journal, Al Ahd, was founded in the mid 1980s and was soon followed by other weekly journals.[6] Print media was followed by three radio stations, which were eventually eclipsed by Al Manar.[7] More recent advancements in internet technology and production capabilities have allowed for the integration of Nour Radio, Al Manar and its print media through many of the group’s websites,[8] providing a convergent platform to what was already a robust media presence.
The political goals of Hizbullah’s media program have also evolved over the years. After Al Manar’s inception in 1991, the station enabled Hizbullah to mobilize its local Shia constituency and to erode Israeli support for the occupation of south Lebanon.[9] Hizbullah also aimed to nationalize its efforts by using its media outlets to appeal to other Lebanese sectarian groups.[10] The airing of combat on the station and websites amplified the effects of Hizbullah’s attrition campaign against the IDF by broadcasting Israel’s battlefield losses on the Internet and television, thus tilting Israeli public opinion towards withdrawal from south Lebanon.[11]
With the broadening of Hizbullah’s constituency in the Arab world, Al Manar’s broadcasts have evolved in reaction to trends within the local, regional and international contexts.[12] The increase in Al Manar’s broadcast capability from a local TV station to an international satellite station in May of 2000 coincided with Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon.[13] During the second Palestinian Intifada in the fall of 2000, Hizbullah sought to capitalize on Al Manar for its newfound regional agenda by declaring that it would provide direct assistance to the Palestinian resistance.[14] The goals of Al Manar’s coverage of the Intifada were to bring live coverage of the conflict to Arab households around the world, mobilize widespread support for resistance efforts and, not least, to link Palestinian struggles against Israel with Hizbullah’s own success against the occupation of south Lebanon.[15]
Subsequently, Al Manar’s popularity amongst the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories has come to rival that of Al Jazeera.[16] This enabled Hizbullah to co-opt the Palestinian struggle into its media campaign with Al Manar producing several dramatic documentaries depicting the daily suffering of Palestinians at the hand of the Israelis, including the torturing of Palestinian prisoners.[17] Beyond Palestinians, however, Al Manar has only managed to reach out to a niche audience compared to stations like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya.[18]
Hizbullah’s integration of its media with internet technology in recent years has enhanced its ability to reach multiple constituencies.[19] This is because the presentation of media through convergent platforms allows individuals to access a wide reservoir of content from anywhere at any time, thereby increasing the accessibility of the group’s media.[20] Additionally, the gradual integration of Hizbullah’s media into platforms such as YouTube also suggest that structural factors inherent to new media convergence, namely the overlap of networks and media spheres, are also facilitating this process. [21]
Yet while internet technology has broadened the reach of an already robust media apparatus, scope alone is not sufficient to significantly boost the political utility of Hizbullah’s media. The true cornerstone of Hizbullah’s media strategy is content which frames political violence within a narrative that has currency with both domestic and regional audiences – that of resistance. I will argue that by integrating contemporary events with historical images, sounds and discourses of resistance derived from Shia Islam and pan-Arabism, Hizbullah has capitalized on political violence to advance its political and military goals.
‘Resistance’ as a timeless narrative
Hizbullah has developed politically in both domestic and regional terms since its formative years as an armed resistance to Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon in the 1980s and 90s. As the group has gradually been integrated into mainstream Lebanese politics since entering the parliamentary process in 1992, it has attained influence as a regional player by portraying itself as a pan-Arab resistance, and increasingly so after Israel’s withdrawal in 2000.[22] While Hizbullah’s early rhetoric emphasized its roots within Lebanon’s Shia constituency, much of the group’s discourse since the second Palestinian Intifada has contained both Arab nationalist overtones and Lebanese proto-nationalism.[23] Subsequently, the group’s political platform has broadened, allowing it to adapt to the shifting landscape of regional politics.[24]
Hizbullah has consistently positioned itself as a force resisting the actions of Israel and the superpowers, to which they attribute the subjugation and oppression of the Third World.[25] Accordingly, Hizbullah’s discourse remains constructed around the notion of resistance that largely stems from its fight against the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanese territory. This ideal of defiance against oppressive forces has remained central to Hizbullah’s self-proclaimed mission even after the Israeli withdrawal. [26] The group has adopted Shebaa Farms and other territorial disputes along the Lebanese-Syrian border into its list of grievances to maintain the pretext for armed resistance since Israel’s military presence inside Lebanon has all but vanished.[27] But beyond the territorial disputes, the foundations of Hizbullah’s revisionism can be traced to its Shia-influenced political culture where militancy and religiosity are closely interlinked.
Defiance of oppression in Shia doctrine is an ideal that transcends both time and space as embodied in the story of the death of Imam Hussein Ibn Ali in 680 AD at Karbala. According to Shia interpretations, when given the choice of either submitting to the demands of then Ummayad Caliph Yazid and his army at Karbala, or resisting and suffering imminent death, Hussein chose to fight, even after the loss of his companions and family to Yazid’s army.[28] As a result of his sacrifice, a sense of righteousness is attributed to those who follow in the footsteps of those martyred at Karbala and partake in the symbolic struggle for justice against oppression.[29] Slogans derived from the story of Karbala that have become definitive of Shia political Islam such as, “every day is Ashoura and every land is Karbala” and “humiliation is far from us,” suggest that the political ideal of resistance is also an expression of faith that transcends both time and space.[30]
The martyrdom of Imam Hussein at Karbala is a reference point around which Hizbullah has framed contemporary issues and events. For example, in his elegy to former Secretary General ‘Abbas al-Mussawi in February of 1992, current Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah compared the assassination of Mussawi and members of his family to that of Hussein and his family at Karbala stating, “As if your bombed and destroyed cortege were Hussein’s tents burning in the desert, as if you were that same Hussein, the commander on the battlefield, Hussein the rebel in the face of oppression and despotism… you, my master, epitomize all that Karbala represented.”[31] More recently, videos broadcast on Al Manar and websites in commemoration of Mughniyeh’s death use imagery from Karbala, where Mughniyeh is referred to as a “Knight of Hussein” arriving on his horse from Karbala to join previous high-profile Hizbullah martyrs in paradise.[32]
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Email this article[1] Regarding Mughniyeh’s assassination, note that Israel has so far denied partaking in the act, despite Hizbullah’s accusing it of undertaking the operation. Furthermore, the results of a Syrian-led investigation into the matter have yet to be disclosed. For more on this and Imad Mughniyeh see, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7242383.stm, and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7246715.stm.
[2] Rohozinski, Rafal, “Bullets to Bytes: Reflections on ICTs and ‘Local’ Conflict”, in R., Latham (ed.), Bombs and bandwidth: the emerging relationship between Information Technology and security, New York: New Press, 2003, pg. 222. The best examples of this in the group's websites are www.wa3ad.org and www.bintjbeil.org. These websites feature various print media, links to Al Nour streaming radio, links to Al Manar streaming satellite television, various audio/video libraries, and RSS feeds.
[3] Dallal, Jenine Abboushi, "Hizbullah's Virtual Civil Society," Television & New Media, Vol. 2 No. 4, November 2001, pg. 367.
[4] Wehrey, Frederic, '"A Clash of Wills: Hizballah's psychological Campaing Against Israel in South Lebanon", Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 13, No. 3. (Autumn 2002), pg. 65.
[5] See, "The Internet as a battleground used by the terrorist organizations: How Hizbullah and Hamas exploit the Internet in the battle for the hearts and minds, and how to combat them'," Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at (IICC), 1 August 2007, pg. 4.
[6] For example see the journal Al-Intiqad available online at: http://www.alintiqad.com/.
[7] Schleifer, Ron, "Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hizbullah versus Israel," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2006, pg.13.
[8] For example see www.wa3ad.org. This website was created after the outbreak of the July War of 2006 on 21 July 2006 according to http://www.alexa.com/data/details/main?q=&url=www.wa3ad.org, accessed July 31, 2007.
[9] Wehrey, pg. 65.
[10] Ibid. pp. 53, 58.
[11] See, Ibid, pp. 64-66. Note that Al Manar also broadcasted in Hebrew.
[12] Baylouny, Anne Marie, "Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Station and Ideologies," CSRC discussion paper 05/49, September 2005, pg. 6.
[13] Ibid, pg. 4.
[14] Harik, pg. 161.
[15] Ibid., pg. 160.
[16] Wehrey, pg. 69.
[17] Schleifer, pg. 15.
[18] Lynch, Marc, Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, pg. 45.
[19] See, "The Internet as a battleground used by the terrorist organizations: How Hizbullah and Hamas exploit the Internet in the battle for the hearts and minds, and how to combat them'," Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at (IICC), August 1, 2007, pg. 4.
[20] See, Berenger, Ralph D., "Introduction: War in Cyberspace", Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 12 (2006), pg. 180.
[21] See, Anderson, Jon W., "Convergence, Next Phase of the Information Revolution," Working Papers on New Media & Information Technology (NMIT) in the Middle East, 2006, pg. 5, Accessed from: http://nmit.georgetown.edu/papers/recon_anderson.htm, May 20, 2007.
[22] For Hizbullah’s integration into Lebanese politics see, Harik, Judith Palmer, Hizbullah: The Changing Face or Terrorism, London; New York: I.B. Taurus, 2004, pg. 47. For Hizbullah’s self-portrayal as a Pan-Arab resistance see, Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal, Hizb'ullah: Politics & Religion, London: Seattle; Pluto Press, 2002, pg. 78.
[23] For Hizbullah’s initial anti-confessional stance see, Harb, M. and Leenders, R., “Know thy enemy: Hizbullah, ‘terrorism’ and the politics of perception”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2005, pg. 179. For Hizbullah’s Lebanese Shia support base see, Norton, Augustus Richard, Hizbullah: A Short History, Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007, pg. 33. For the group’s Arab nationalist overtones and Lebanese nationalism see, Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal, pp. 78, 82.
[24] Norton, pg. 45.
[25] Ibid., pg. 38.
[26] Harb, and Leenders, pp. 180-181.
[27] For more information on the issue of Shebaa Farms and other territorial disputes see, Norton, Augustus Richard, "The Role of Hizbullah in Domestic Lebanese Politics", International Spectator, 42:4, 2007, pp. 476-9.
[28] For a detailed account of this story see, Aslan, Reza, No God but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam, Random House, 2005, Ch. 7.
[29] See, Ibid, pg. 178. Note that some argue that the concept of Hussein embodying defiance gained political currency during the Iranian revolution. For analysis on this see, Aysha, Emad El-Din, "Foucault's Iran and Islamic Identity Politics Beyond Civilian Clashes, External and Internal", International Studies Perspectives, (2006) 7, pg. 382.
[30] The slogan “every day is Ashoura and every land is Karbala” was first made popular during the Iranian Revolution. See, Poulson, Stephen C., Social Movements in Twentieth-century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing Frameworks, Lexington Books, 2005, pg. 44. It also appears in coverage of an Ashoura procession in south Beirut (1983) in the Al Manar documentary, “The Proud Suburb”, (author’s translation), which is accessible at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IhPeL0Y_CGw. The slogan heyhat mina azzila can be loosely translated as, “Humiliation is far from us”. It is believed to have been uttered by Hussein at Karbala when he was asked to submit to Yazid’s demands. Thus, in this context it can be seen as representing choosing martyrdom over the humiliation of subservience. The slogan continues to appear to this day written on Hizbullah paraphernalia, and continues to be utilized in the group’s discourse and media.
[31] Translation of Hassan Nasrallah's speech according to Khouri, Ellen,"Elegy for Sayyed ‘Abbas Mussawi: February 18, 1992", in N., Noe (ed.), Voice of Hizbullah: the statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Verso: London; New York, 2007, pg.52.
[32] Author's translation of video, "Radwan... Paradise bloom with his [arrival]" accessed from: http://www.almanar.com.lb/Video/HajRedwan/Redwan_Tazhou.wmv. Author's translation of video "You have dismounted oh knight of Hussein", accessed from: http://www.almanar.com.lb/Video/HajRedwan/TaragaltYaFares.wmv.
[33] Author's translation of Al Manar's coverage of Ashoura entitled, "The Day of Ashoura 1429", accessible from: http://www.wa3ad.org/index.php?show=sounds&action=play&id=407.
[34] Author's translation. Note that in this context, the term "humiliation" would be the result of subservience and submitting to the 'enemy's' demands as it was for Hussein at Karbala.
[35] See, Husseini, Muhammad, "El-Hajj Imad Mughniyeh is amongst the caravan of martyred leaders after a quarter century of jihad and resistance", Al-Intiqad, February 15, 2008, accessible from: http://www.alintiqad.com/__print.php?filename=200802150943100.
[36] See Hizbullah’s English translation of Nasrallah’s Islamic Resistance Week speech at: http://english.hizbollah.tv/essaydetails.php?eid=2450&cid=231. Note that ‘backbone’ is a derivation of Mughniyeh’s first name Imad meaning ‘pillar’. It can also mean ‘general’ in a military context.
[37] Author's translation of, "The Sayed Nasrallah swears to the leader Mughniyeh: Your blood will not go in vain", Al Manar, February 22, 2008, accessed from: http://www.wa3ad.org/index.php?show=news&action=print&id=17443.
[38] See, Husseini.
[39] For more detail on Islamic Resistance Week see Author’s translation of, Ameen, Manhal, "In the week of the Resistance: some of the two epics of Harb and Mussawi", Al-Akhbar, February 21, 2008, accessible from: http://www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/64487/print.
[40] For coverage of previous Islamic Resistance Week ceremonies see, "Sayed 'Abbas al-Mussawi's speech during Islamic Resistance Week and on the martyrdom of Sheikh Ragheb Harb in Sahmar 2-16-1991", accessible from: http://www.moqawama.org/_leabbaskhitab.php?filename=200511261216334. Also see video archive covering last year's Islamic Resistance Week on February 16, 2007, "The speech of Sayed Hassan Nasrallah in the Islamic Reisistance Week and the anniversary of the martyrdom of General Secretary 'Abbas al-Mussawi and the Shiekh of the Martyrs Ragheb Harb in audio and video", accessible from: http://www.shiaweb.org/hizbulla/video/moqawama/index.html.
[41] For example, see preceremonial coverage in Al Intiqad at: http://www.alintiqad.com/bar/newsdetails.php?id=123767.
[42] Author's translation, "The statements of the families of the martyred leaders in the festival pledging allegiance to the martyrs", www.wa3ad.org, February 22, 2008, accessible from: http://www.wa3ad.org/index.php?show=news&action=print&id=17449. Al Manar’s coverage of the event can be seen at, http://www.wa3ad.org/index.php?show=sounds&action=play&id=419. Video footage of Jihad Mughniyeh’s speech from the event is also accessible from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9v6WniPGvs.
[43] Author’s translation, Al Manar satellite broadcast via streaming video from: http://www.bintjbeil.org/plusweb/indexmanar.htm, February 28, 2008, 1820 EDT. This short documentary, which first aired on February 27, 2008 at 21:30 (EEST), was also reported on by As-Safir daily. See, ““The Omen of Victory’ on ‘Al Manar’”, As-Safir, February 27, 2008, accessible from: http://www.assafir.com/Windows/ArticlePrintFriendly.aspx?EditionId=874&ChannelId=19741&ArticleId=2993.
[44] Video accessible from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8zYhNsqoTU. The music is performed by the Hizbullah-inspired musical group Firqat al-Wilaya. The music from this segment also appears as part of an album comprised of songs commemorating Mughniyeh available for download at: http://www.wa3ad.org/index.php?show=sounds&action=play&id=423.
[45]"Radwan" is part of the affectionate alias, "El-Hajj Radwan", that was bestowed upon Imad Mughniyah.
[46] Author's translation of video first viewed on Al Manar via internet feed at: http://wmtvs.com/asx/live_TV_online_59498.asx, February 20, 2008 at 1326 EDT. It is accessible at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VA3trVqTQTE&feature=related.
[47] Author's translation of video, "Radwan... Paradise bloom with his [arrival]" accessed from: http://www.almanar.com.lb/Video/HajRedwan/Redwan_Tazhou.wmv. Author's translation of video "You have dismounted oh knight of Hussein", accessed from: http://www.almanar.com.lb/Video/HajRedwan/TaragaltYaFares.wmv. Also available on YouTube at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M0_g8FQ7TU4.
[48] Note that this video was produced within hours of Mughniyeh's death. Author's translation of an excerpt from Al Manar coverage posted on YouTube on February 13, 2008. View the video starting at (4:39), accessible from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q5Sn-emr934&feature=related.
[49] Dahyieh, which translates literally as "suburb", are the southern suburbs of Beirut known for being Hizbullah's primary support base in the area.
[50] This is the title of a music video produced by Al Manar in celebration of the first anniversary of the July War commemorating the ‘victory’ as one on behalf the entire Arab world. A version can be viewed online at: http://wa3ad.org/index.php?show=sounds&action=play&id=364.
[51] For example, one clip that Al Manar aired stated that, "The protection of the resistance is the protection of Lebanon", author's translation, viewed at http://www.wa3ad.org/live-manar.html, August 8, 2006. Another clip that aired in the conflicts aftermath stated, "we are the liberation of Shebaa Farms, Talal Kafr Shuba, and every inch of land in our beloved Lebanon", author's translation, viewed at http://www.wa3ad.org/live-manar.html, August 20, 2006.
[52] See, Pintak, Lawrence, "Reporting a Revolution: The Changing Arab Media Landscape", Arab Media & Society, (February 2007), pg. 3.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Author's translation of video footage first viewed online during Al Manar live web broadcast at http://www.wa3ad.org/live-manar.html, August 21, 2006. It is available for download at: http://www.wa3ad.org/video/anasheed/5alli_ilsila7_9a7i.wmv. Note a literal translation of the title would be “Keep the Weapons Awake”. Both of these videos are also available on YouTube. For "Keep the Weapons Ready", see, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NROft02SpzE&feature=related, and for "God is Great" see, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pONbPfccAaY.
[55] See, Abu Shawar, Rashad, "Keep the Weapons Ready", Al Quds Al Arabi, August 23, 2006, accessible from: http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=2006\08\08-23\z19.htm&storytitle=ff%CE%E1%F8%ED%20%C7%E1%D3%E1%C7%CD%20%D5%C7%CD%Edfff. Al Manar’s version of the video “God is Great” is accessible from: http://www.wa3ad.org/video/anasheed/allah_akbar.wmv.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Author’s translation.
[58] For sample translation of this anthem see, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allahu_Akbar_%28anthem%29.
[59] Translation of Hassan Nasrallah's speech on May 26, 2000 according to Khouri, Ellen, "Victory", in N., Noe (ed.), Voice of Hizbullah: the statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Verso: London; New York, pg. 233.
[60] Author’s translation of Abu Shawar.
[61] Author’s translation of video accessed from: http://wa3ad.org/index.php?show=sounds&action=play&id=368, August 5, 2007.
[62] For more on combat in Suez City see, Jordan, Maj. Michael C., “The 1973 Arab-Israel War: Arab Policies, Strategies, and Campaigns”, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College, 1997, accessible from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Jordan.htm.
[63] Author’s translation of video. “A Resistance Speaks to the Resistance from an Egyptian Point of View”.
[64] Author's translation of video that originally aired on Al Manar on July 20, 2007. Note that nasr in its Arabic title, Nasr al-Arab, could be interpreted as having two meanings. Literally it means victory, but it can also be seen as a play on the first part of Hassan Nasrallah's last name, and thus emulating his status as an Arab leader. The video was accessed from: http://wa3ad.org/index.php?show=sounds&action=play&id=364, August 4, 2007.
[65] The group's website can be seen at: www.welaya-hlb.com.
[66] Qubaysi, Fatin, "'The Victory of the Arabs' Al Manar's second clip for the anniversary of the oppression[of 2006]", As-Safir, January 31, 2007, accessible from: http://www.assafir.com/Windows/ArticlePrintFriendly.aspx?EditionId=703&ChannelId=15586&ArticleId=3324.
[67] See, Ibid. Also see Al Manar’s documentary on the project accessible from: http://www.welaya-hlb.com/video/naser.wmv.
[68] Author's translation.
[69] "The Internet as a battleground used by the terrorist organizations...", Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at (IICC), pg. 4.
[70] Based upon data on www.wa3ad.org, and www.almanar.lb.com from, http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details?url=www.wa3ad.org, and http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details?url=www.almanar.com.lb, accessed July 31, 2007.
[71] See, the role of multiple channels of communication in soft power in, Nye, Joseph S. Jr., "The Information Revolution and Soft Power", Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2002, pg. 70.
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